Cognitive dissonance theory predicts that the act of voting for a candidate leads to a more favorable opinion of the candidate in the future. We find support for the empirical relevance of cognitive dissonance to political attitudes. We examine the presidential opinion ratings of voting age eligibles and ineligibles two years after the president's election. We find that eligibles show 2-3 times greater polarization of opinions than comparable ineligibles. We find smaller effects when we compare polarization in opinions of senators elected during high turnout presidential campaign years with senators elected during non-presidential campaign years. * We are extremely grateful to Thomas Wang for superb research assistance and to
Introduction
While models of voting behavior vary considerably, one common assumption of models of both turnout and vote choice is that voting behavior is an expression of preferences or beliefs. Whether voters are motivated by a desire to shift the outcome of the election to their desired outcome, as in instrumental models, or by the desire to express strong feelings on the part of themselves or of their group, as in intensity and popularity models respectively, voting models assume that preferences are a variable in the voting decision equation. (See for example Aldrich, 1993; Coate and Conlin, 2004; Grossman and Helpman, 2001 and Matsuaka and Palda, 1999 for summaries of voter turnout models.) Psychologists on the other hand have highlighted that causation may also run in the opposite direction: actions themselves may drive preferences and beliefs. Numerous experiments have led to the conclusion that behavioral change may precede attitudinal change (Bandura, 1989) . One explanation for the impact of behaviors on beliefs is cognitive dissonance (Festinger, 1957) which refers to one's internal need for consistency. If an individual performs an activity that is antithetical to his beliefs, the individual may unconsciously change his beliefs to alleviate the discomfort of having inconsistent attitudes and actions. 1 For example, in a classic experiment (Festinger and Carlsmith, 1959) , subjects were asked to perform for an hour the boring task of placing knobs on pegs, turning them, and then taking the pegs off again. After the task was completed, each experimental subject was told that the research assistant had not shown up and that the scientists needed the subject's help in recruiting more participants. Subjects were told they would receive either $1 or $20 ($7 or $135 in 2006 dollars) for their assistance. After each subject convinced the new recruit, really a confederate of the experiment, that the task was fun, the subject was asked for a rating of 1 This impact of behavior on attitudes is most commonly known as cognitive dissonance, which is also how we will refer to it. Psychological research on the other hand has shown that several other mechanisms besides the one emphasized by a narrowly defined cognitive dissonance theory could produce a similar effect. For example, self perception theory (Bem, 1967) provides a second explanation for the impact of behaviors on beliefs: Individuals infer their opinions from their own actions. The publication of the 1967 article sparked great debate: "But as evidence began to accumulate that dissonance was indeed an unpleasant state of arousal, self-perception theory began to wane as an explanation for dissonance phenomena." (Hogg and Cooper, 2003) . We continue to use the phrase cognitive dissonance because of its use in common parlance, and not to signify how much s/he truly enjoyed the experiment. Those who were paid $1 rated the task much more favorably than those who were paid $20. The theory of cognitive dissonance explains the result by assuming that most people believe themselves to be truthful unless they have strong incentives to behave otherwise. Those who were told they would receive $20 had a strong incentive to lie. Those who were told they would receive $1 had no such incentive. Therefore those in the $1 group felt the discomfort (dissonance) of having inconsistent actions (lying to new recruit) and beliefs (I am a truthful person and the task was really boring). Unable to change the past action of telling the new recruit that the task was enjoyable, those in the $1 group had no other option but to change their belief that the task was boring to believe that the task was, in fact, enjoyable.
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In the intervening years, empiricists have discovered that dissonance can be aroused even when behaviors are in line with attitudes. Aronson et. al (1991) had college students create videos to encourage high school students to practice safe sex. Some of these students were then asked to think about their own failures to use condoms in the past. For this group of students, the discrepancy between their past behavior and the message they were currently preaching appears to have aroused dissonance. Members of this group stated greater intentions to use condoms in the future.
3 Dissonance is not limited to cases in which subjects are trying to persuade others. Since the 1959 study, empiricists have explored the relevance of cognitive dissonance to a large variety of contexts including socialization of children, curing snake phobias, interpersonal attraction, proselytizing, gambling and water conservation (Aronson, 1999) .
Applying cognitive dissonance to the context of voting, two years after an election a citizen who voted for a candidate may hold a favorable opinion of that politician in part to avoid the internal discomfort of having voted for a person for whom the individual has a poor a position on which specific psychological mechanisms may be at work. 2 Because the idea of being a truthful person was a longer held and probably more fundamental part of a person's self-perception, it was likely easier for subjects to change opinions of the experiment than of their own veracity. 3 The treatment group not only had greater intentions, they also had greater behavioral changes in condom use. (Stone et .al, 1994) .
opinion. 4 Suggestive evidence that dissonance applies in the voting context comes most recently from Besley and Joslyn (2001) . 5 Using the National Election Study, the authors demonstrate that those who report voting in the presidential election show greater polarization in their ratings of the two candidates immediately after the election than immediately before (as compared to those who do not report having voted). Clearly, the endogeneity of the voting decision (and the reporting of the voting decision) leaves us unable to treat these results as evidence of a causal link between voting and increased polarization. Suppose that in December 2004 we compare two Republicans, both of whom favored Bush in the 2004
election, but only one of whom actually turned out to vote. Let's call them Persons V (voter) and N (non-voter). It would not be surprising to observe, even under the traditional purview, that Person V had a more positive opinion of Bush than Person N. If probability of turnout is increasing in intensity of preference and preferences linger, such a correlation would arise nearly mechanically. Thus, in our test of the relevance of cognitive dissonance to voting behavior, our identification strategy must rely on variables that impact turnout but that are independent of voter preferences.
The age restriction on voting is one such variable. Consider two individuals in 1996 who both support Clinton and who are eighteen and seventeen years old respectively. Let's call them Persons O (older) and Y (younger). The eighteen year old is able to express his support of Clinton at the polls, whereas the seventeen year old is not. Suppose now we examine their views of Clinton in 1998 when his approval ratings had fallen. Traditional models predict no systematic differences in the trends in views of these two persons. On the other hand, cognitive dissonance theory would lead us to believe that Person Y (now 19) would show a greater fall in his Clinton approval rating than Person 0 (now 20). Person 0 4 These processes may be reinforced by social networks. Individuals may find it hard to renounce a position that they have not only voted in accordance with, but also announced publicly, previously. In fact in a survey of New York City voters in the week prior to the 2005 mayoral election, we found that simply asking voters whether they planned to vote (to which they nearly unanimously replied yes) increased turnout by four percentage points in a group whose mean turnout was extremely high (88 percent). Respondents were randomly selected to the commit/not commit to vote groups. 5 Ginsberg and Weissberg (1978) , Sticker (1964) and Thomsen (1938) also examine opinion change in views of candidates from before to after an election.
having made a concrete act of commitment to Clinton, through voting, would find it harder to walk away from that position. In contrast, if the two had been Dole supporters in 1996, the psychological model would predict a different pattern of change, from before to after the election. Cognitive dissonance theory would now predict that Person 0 would show the larger decline in Clinton approval, jumping on information that supported his previous action, whereas Person Y would show a smaller decline viewing new information in a more moderated way. This logic implies a fairly simple prediction: voting eligibles should show greater post-election polarization than voting ineligibles.
We test this prediction using data from US elections from 1976 to 1996. Our dependent variables are individuals' ratings of presidential performance, gathered two years after each presidential election in the National Election Study. Our sample consists of young people who were eligible to vote in the previous election (20 and 21 year olds) as well as those who were ineligible (18 and 19 year olds). We compare the polarization (by party) of these two groups in their attitudes towards the president. For a variety of attitudinal measures, we find a great deal of increased polarization. Eligible youth are nearly two times as polarized as ineligible ones. When we scale our results by turnout, we find that voters are three times as polarized as nonvoters. We examine a second source of exogenous variation in voter turnout. Senatorial elections vary greatly in turnout depending on whether they are held in presidential or interim election years. For voters of all ages, we compare attitudes towards senators based on the year in which the senator was most recently (re)elected. We again find differential polarization by party. Attitudes towards senators elected in presidential years are roughly 25 percent more polarized than towards senators elected in nonpresidential years. 6 Scaling by the turnout differential between the two groups, we find that the act of voting more than doubles polarization.
Before concluding that these results demonstrate the applicability of cognitive dissonance theory to voter turnout, we first consider the relevance of three potentially confounding factors. First, our results may be driven by age-induced polarization. Perhaps, 6 Turnout percentages are calculated using the National Election Survey's voter verification survey conducted in 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, 1988 and 1990. older Americans have more divergent views. 7 The senatorial results demonstrate that aging cannot explain all of our results. We further test the aging hypothesis directly in two ways.
First, we compare 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year olds, thus comparing different age groups all of whom were eligible to vote in the previous presidential election. In contrast to the age induced polarization hypothesis, we find greater polarization among the younger group than the older. However the difference is not statistically significant. In a second placebo test we focus on presidential election years, comparing opinions of 18 and 19 year olds to those of 20 and 21 year olds. Neither of these groups was eligible to vote for the sitting president. Again, we find no significant difference in polarization between groups. These results suggest that our findings are not due merely to aging.
Second, we consider the possibility that our results are biased by the fact that party is measured at the same time as the attitudinal surveys are conducted. Perhaps a respondent's positive (negative) feelings about the president lead her to report herself as a member (not a member) of the president's party. We address the potential endogeneity of party report in two ways. First, we substitute predicted vote choice (based on demographic characteristics) for the party variable. Results are qualitatively unchanged. Our second test circumvents the need for a party variable. We show that eligibles are unconditionally more likely to hold views in the tails of the presidential feeling distribution.
Finally, we consider that increased polarization may be driven by information rather than dissonance. Perhaps those who vote collect more political information during or after the electoral campaign. If they interpret this information in a manner that is favorable to their candidate, as confirmatory bias would suggest (Lord, Ross and Lepper, 1979) they will show increased polarization. To test this hypothesis, we examine knowledge, exposure and interest in politics for eligible and ineligible youth. We find no significant differences in levels of knowledge, exposure or interest, suggesting that interest and information are not the mechanism driving the link between voting and increased polarization.
As a whole, these results suggest the practical importance of cognitive dissonance theory for the political arena. 8 This finding has implications for the political capital of politicians. By definition in a two party race more than half of voters vote for the winner.
Therefore elected officials receive a boost in their approval ratings due to dissonance.
In the remainder of the paper we present our results more formally. In Section 2, we discuss the data and methodology. Results that exploit the voting age regulations are presented in Section 3. Results that exploit the variation in turnout between presidential and non-presidential years are shown in Section 4. Section 5 concludes by discussing implications of our results for voting behavior.
2 E m p i r i c a l M e t h o d o l o g y a n d D a t a
The core hypothesis we would like to test is that voting for a particular candidate today increases one's opinion of that candidate in the future. To address this concern we need an exogenous factor that drives voters to vote that is unrelated to their preferences at the time. We identify two such factors. The first is age. Only individuals who have reached the age of 18 on Election Day may cast a ballot. The second is the timing of the election. Turnout is higher in presidential elections than in interim elections. Thus there are exogenous shifts in turnout for congressional elections.
Age R e s t r i c t i o n s
During the time frame of our study An empirical problem in implementing this strategy is that we must impute which candidate an ineligible voter would have voted for had they voted. We, therefore, examine polarization by party affiliation for eligible and ineligible voters. Such a procedure is sensible since party identification strongly predicts vote choice (Keith et. al, 1992 and Miller and Shanks, 1996) .
Empirically, we estimate an equation of the form:
( Our data are drawn from the National Election Study (NES), a survey of the political behaviors and opinions of a cross-section of voting age Americans. Respondents' views are collected in face-to-face interviews conducted in the fall of even numbered years.
As presidential elections occur every four years, the NES provides data from both presidential and interim election years. We focus on non-presidential election years, promote social change.
comparing those who were eligible to vote in the prior election to those who were ineligible.
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Our sample period is from 1978 to 2000; 10 therefore we have six non-presidential election years of data.
The great advantage of the NES is its multitude of questions on individuals' opinions of elected officials. Our main dependent variable is a thermometer question which asks respondents to rate their feelings regarding the president on a scale from 0 to 100. Other questions are more specific and more crudely measured. The NES asks respondents to rate on a scale from 1 to 4 the extent to which they agree that the president is inspiring, is knowledgeable, is moral, is a good leader, is caring, earns your approval in general and earns your approval in his handling of the economy. The NES asks respondents whether they agree with the statement that the president makes them afraid, angry, hopeful and proud and whether they approve of the president.
Since our identification strategy exploits the voting eligibility age threshold, we focus on young people. For greater comparability between eligible and ineligible voters we limit our sample to individuals whose age places them within two years of voting eligibility. Hence we limit our sample to individuals aged 18-21 at time t, the non-presidential year. This sample consists of two groups. Those who are 18-19 were 16-17 at the time of the election and were ineligible to vote. Those who are 20-21 were 18-19 at the time of the election and were eligible to vote.
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This reduces our sample to 554, of whom 248 were ineligible and 306 were eligible to vote. Table 1 presents the means for the full sample (column 1) and by age group (columns 2 and 3). Not surprisingly the older group is significantly more likely to have graduated from high school, to be employed and to be married, as indicated in the first page of the table. The younger group has significantly higher income, homeownership and union membership rates which is also not surprising as these demographics are measured at the household level and younger respondents are more likely to be living with their parents. There is a marginally significant increased tendency for younger voters to identify as Independent 12 voters. And there are no significant differences between the groups on the remaining demographic characteristics: education, urban location, Republican and Democratic identification and race.
The second part of Table 1 presents the means of the various measures rating the performance of the president. The first, the thermometer variable, is a rating of respondents' overall feelings on a scale from 0 to 100 for the president. The remaining outcome variables focus on more specific aspects of the president's performance and attributes. Variables are rescaled as necessary so that a higher rating is more favorable to the president in power for all outcome measures. Average ratings differ significantly between groups in only two of 13 measures.
In implementing our regression, we will control for the observables listed in Table 1, as well as state and year effects. We recognize that the impact of observables on one's opinion of the president will vary by the political party of the president. For example, males are more likely than females to support a Republican president during this time period, but less likely to support a Democratic president (Edlund and Pande, 2002) . For this reason we also include a full set of observables interacted with a dummy for the political party of the president. Thus we estimate:
where a t and g s are state and year fixed.
P r esi d e n t i al Year Turnout
Our second test exploits the fact that there is higher turnout in presidential election years than in interim election years. Therefore, Americans are more likely to vote for Congress when there to simply compare 19 and 20 year olds.
is a concurrent presidential race. For example, in 2000, senators elected two years prior (an interim election year) saw lower turnout in their most recent elections than their colleagues most recently elected four years prior (a presidential election year.) Consequently, cognitive dissonance predicts more polarization in constituent views of a senator elected in a presidential election year over one elected in a non-presidential year. 13 As before, we focus on party polarization. We therefore estimate an equation of the form:
(3) Opinion of Senator ijt =a t + bElected in Presidential Year jt +c P a r t y ij +d(Elected jt *P a r t y ij )
where i indexes individuals, j indexes senators, and t indexes time. The variable "Elected in
Presidential Year" indicates that the particular senator was last elected concurrently with a presidential election and "Party" indicates that person i is of the same party as Senator j . As before, a t and g s are state and year fixed effects. We allow the error term ε ijst to be clustered by state. Once again we allow the impact of observables to differ by political party by including as controls the variables listed in Table 2 as well as their interactions with a dummy for political party of the focal senator.
Using this sampling frame, we increase our sample size greatly as we may now include all NES respondents. In fact given that an individual may be represented by up to two senators who are not seeking reelection in the focal year, many individuals appear in our dataset twice. 14 One limitation is that we must focus only on years in which the NES collected the thermometer variable for incumbent senators not up for reelection. This reduces our sample to the years 1978-1994, excluding 1984 . However, because we are no longer restricted to interim election years, we are left with eight years of data. The party variable is based on respondent self-identification. 13 We cannot perform the same comparison for representatives who face election every two years because of lack of variation in election timing. At any time all sitting representatives were elected during a Presidential election year or all sitting representatives were elected during a non-presidential year. 14 Clustering the error term by state allows for a lack of independence amongst observations from the same senators were elected in a non-presidential year and 7238 individuals whose senators were elected in a presidential year respectively. The two groups differ significantly in only one of 16 demographic characteristics: percent black. The Senate thermometer, a rating of the respondent's feelings toward the senator on a scale from 0 to 100, also shows no difference in average rating between groups.
3 Results of Age Eligibility Test
In Table 3 we display estimation of equation 2, which compares party polarization for 18 and 19 year olds versus 20 and 21 year olds in our data. The table reflects a single regression with controls for log income and dummies for being employed, having graduated from high school, being married, living in an urban area, being in a union and being a homeowner. Also included are dummies for race, gender, state and year. The first column of the table lists the coefficients on the main effects. Since our identification comes, however, from the interaction of "Eligibility" and "Party", we also include as controls the interaction of all demographics and region with the party dummy. The coefficients on the interacted variables are included in the second column.
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The first three rows display the primary variables of interest. Recall that "Eligible " is defined as being 20 or 21 in the sample, which would make the person 18 or 19 in the election year two years prior. The party variable is defined as "Same Party as President". So, in 1998, Democrats would be coded as 1 while Republicans and Independents would be coded as 0. For the 1990 data, Republicans would be coded as 1 whereas Democrats and Independents would be coded as 0. The coefficient on party in this Table is 10.117 which indicates that for ineligibles there is approximately a 10 point difference in the thermometer between those of the president's party and everyone else. As we see in Table 1 , the mean of the Thermometer variable is roughly 59 with a standard deviation of 25. Thus party affiliation "explains" 40 percent of a standard deviation of feelings toward the president.
individual. 15 While we display only one specification in Table 3 , our results are robust to including a full set of respondent party*president's party controls, including state*year fixed effects, eliminating our demographic controls and their interactions and clustering our standard errors by state and by state*year*eligibility.
The significant interaction term "Eligible*Party" shows that this polarization increases for those who were eligible to vote. Amongst this population, the members of the president's party are 9.258 points farther apart from everyone else. This suggests that the eligibles are roughly twice as polarized as the ineligibles. This is consistent with the original hypothesis. The eligibles show greater party affiliation than those ineligible to vote. These magnitudes are large especially when one accounts for the fact that the eligible voters (18 and 19 year olds) only vote at a 46 percent rate, implying that the impact of voting on polarization is twice as big as estimated. This suggests the impact of voting alone would lead voters to be about three times as polarized as non-voters.
Both the main effects and interactions of control variables generally enter insignificantly, with three exceptions. The black and urban coefficients suggest that blacks have significantly more positive views of the incumbent president whereas urban residents have significantly more negative views. The black*party interaction enters negatively and significantly suggesting that blacks rate presidents of their own party less favorably than do whites (omitted group). Blacks rate presidents of an opposing party on average more favorably than white respondents.
This basic table relates eligibility to a broad measure of one's feelings towards the president. In Table 4 , we examine the impact of eligibility on more specific attitudinal measures. The broadest of these twelve measures are the two approval scales. More specific questions ask the respondent about his/her approval of the president's handling of the economy and to agree or disagree that the president is inspiring, knowledgeable, moral, a good leader and caring. Respondents are also asked whether the president makes them angry, afraid, hopeful and proud. We continue to run regressions of the form of equation 2. We include the same controls and interactions of controls with the party dummy as in Table 3 . For simplicity, we do not show the coefficients on the controls. Each column of each panel in Table 4 reflects a separate regression with a different dependent variable. Because not all of the twelve questions were asked in all the years, the sample size differs across regressions. Moreover, we have redefined negative variables so that they are positive. For example, Question 7 asks "Does the president make you angry?" We have defined 1 on this question to be "No" and 0 to be "Yes". In this way, across all questions, positive or negative, the cognitive dissonance hypothesis predicts a positive coefficient on "Eligible*Party".
The prediction is borne out: All the coefficients on the interaction terms are positive.
Eligibles are significantly more polarized than ineligibles on six items: approval (both scales), belief that the president is knowledgeable, inspiring, a good leader and makes the respondent angry.
Across questions, the magnitude of the coefficient on "Eligible*Party " is quite large. If we take the point estimates literally, we see as before that the polarization for the eligibles is at least twice as large as the polarization for the ineligibles. 
Confounds
While we have found evidence of increased polarization amongst eligible voters in presidential elections, there are three potential threats to our conclusion that the evidence supports the relevance of cognitive dissonance in the political arena. The first difficulty is that age*party effects may be driven by age differences and not voting induced differences in respondents' opinions. In other words, perhaps older people simply have more polarized views than younger people. To test for this possibility, we perform two falsification exercises, the results of which are reported in Table 5 . The first column of this Table repeats the basic result from Table 3 . Each of the other three columns represents a "placebo" test between two groups who are different in age but not different in eligibility to vote. If aging is the primary cause of increased polarization the "placebo" tests should yield similar results to the basic specification in column 1. If dissonance is the primary driver, interaction terms in columns 2 through 4 should show non-significant coefficients.
In the first exercise (column 2), we compare 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year 16 We also explored the applicability of cognitive dissonance to respondents' attitudes toward other elected officials. The NES asks respondents to rate on a thermometer scale each of their sitting senators. Comparing 18 and 19 year olds' opinions to 20 and 21 year olds' opinions of senators elected two years ago, we find no evidence of dissonance. The eligibility*party coefficient is small, negative and noisily estimated. Comparing 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year olds in regards to senators elected four years ago we find evidence of increased polarization amongst eligibles. Though the magnitude is large, again the effect is noisily estimated and insignificant. For no other elected office does the NES ask respondents to rate officials unless those officials are seeking reelection.
olds, two years after the presidential election. As before both groups differ by two years in age, but both were eligible to vote in the prior election. As we see, these two groups do not show significant differences in polarization. 17 If anything the older group is less polarized, though the difference is not significant. Of course, one could still argue that the polarization effects of aging are concave. It is possible that much of the increase in polarization happens between nineteen and twenty. This story is consistent with our large differences in polarization in column 1 (which compares 18 and 19 year olds to 20 and 21 year olds) and little or no difference in polarization in column 2 (which compares 20 and 21 year olds to 22 and 23 year olds). In column 3 we perform a placebo test that is robust to the concave age effects criticism.
Here we compare 18 and 19 year olds to 20 and 21 year olds, exactly the same age groups as in our basic specification. But we now compare their opinions of the incumbent president in presidential election years. This implies that four years ago, both groups of young people were ineligible to vote. This specification should uncover the relationship between polarization and aging (free of any voting effect) for our sample. As shown in column 3, we find no statistically significant increase in polarization of the older group over the younger group. In column 4 we consider the possibility that the fact that some sitting presidents are eligible to run again while others are not is somehow biasing our results. We repeat the exercise of column 3 but without the election years of 1988 and 2000 when the incumbent president (due to term limits) could not run again. The coefficient of interest is again insignificant and this time negative. In short, these placebo tests suggest that our results are unlikely to be driven by the effect of aging on polarization.
A second potential confound to our dissonance interpretation is the endogeneity of the party affiliation variable. The party variable is based on respondent self-identification.
Respondents are not asked their party identification at the time of the presidential election.
Rather, respondents interviewed during the interim election period are asked for their contemporaneous party identification, which has potentially changed in the intervening two years. For example positive feelings toward Ronald Reagan in 1982 could increase the likelihood that a person identifies as a Republican in that same year. 18 We perform two types of robustness checks to verify that our results are not driven by changing political identities: First, we rerun equation 2 substituting a predicted party variable for self-identified party. Second, we circumvent the need for a party variable by simply asking whether eligible voters are more likely to hold more extreme opinions of the president, i.e. views in the tails of the distribution.
In the first approach, we predict party of vote choice using contemporary demographic characteristics. We then include interactions of this predicted party with a dummy for eligibility exactly as before. To create the prediction we consider all respondents (regardless of age) in each presidential election year. We regress a dummy for whether the respondent voted for the winner on log income and dummies for education, employment status, marital status, urban, state, gender, race, union member and homeowner. For each election, we create two prediction equations, one that does and one that does not include the respondent's party as a regressor because of the variable's potential endogeneity. We then combine the coefficients from these regressions with the data for the subsequent non-presidential year to predict the likelihood that a respondent voted for the president.
The prediction equations are shown in Appendix Table 1 . In columns one to six, we see the basic prediction equations. In columns seven to twelve, we see how the prediction equations change when party is included as a regressor.
We then run the basic regression in equation 2 substituting the predicted vote variable for the potentially endogenous party variable. 19 Given that demographics are used to predict party, it is no longer possible to include these demographics as control variables. The exclusion of these controls does not create bias in estimating the coefficient on our focal independent variable as our identification of "Eligible" comes from the sharp discontinuity in age in voting eligibility. Thus the covariates in Table 3 serve only to reduce the standard errors of our coefficients. This is demonstrated in the first column of Table 6 , which provides results using as those who have already voted (just the 20-21 year olds) in column 1. 18 It is worth noting that for this confound to drive our results, this change in party affiliation must be specific to the older cohort. 19 To account for the fact that the vote choice variable is estimated, the standard errors for This specification has another advantage. We know that not all voters vote along party lines in an election. The specification in Table 6 allows us to rescale the impact of "Party" to account for this fact. Column 3, therefore, repeats this exercise including the party variable as a predictor of voting behavior. Again, we see a large, positive and significant interaction coefficient. Compared to the direct effect of voting for the president, it appears that eligible voters are 65 percent more polarized.
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In the final column of Table 6 , we address the potential endogeneity of party, by turning to a test that does not require a party variable. If eligibles are more polarized than non-eligibles the views of eligibles should fall relatively more frequently in the tails of the opinion distribution. Suggestive evidence of the relative polarization of eligibles comes from the second page of Table 1 where we see that for 10 of 13 opinion measures the standard deviation is larger amongst eligibles than ineligibles. In Table 6 we test for this increased polarization by running a logit of whether the respondent is within a standard deviation of mean opinion of the president for that year on "Eligible". The results indicate that voting eligibles are less likely to have views in the center of the distribution. Although the results are not statistically significant, they are consistent with increased polarization of eligibles.
The third potential confound to our dissonance interpretation is that it is not clear whether our results are due to cognitive dissonance or information effects. Perhaps those who vote collect more political information in future years. Confirmatory bias (Lord et. al, 1979) suggests that they would then interpret that information to favor the candidate for whom they Green (1998,1999) find evidence against confirmatory bias in interpreting information on politician quality. 22 Palfrey and Poole (1987) show a correlation between a voter's information and extremism. However, they provide no evidence as to whether the relationship is causal. election years which is consistent with the knowledge story. However, for the remainder the difference goes in the other direction, again insignificant. The older cohort shows more knowledge, exposure and participation in the election years as compared to non-election years. There is no consistent pattern of greater knowledge, exposure nor interest of 20-21 year olds as compared to 18-19 year olds in non-presidential versus presidential elections.
These results, especially when combined with the aging results of Table 5 make it hard to interpret our polarization findings as due to differential information or campaign targeting. But admittedly the NES measures are somewhat noisy and are collected some two years after the election of interest. It is possible that information increases polarization, but that the increased levels of information are not as enduring as the polarization. However, experimental evidence suggests that political information-delivered in precisely the timing and in one of the manners in which information is delivered during a campaign-does not lead to increased polarization among voters. In a phone survey, we randomly assigned 1000
New York City voters to watch (or not watch) the final mayoral debate between incumbent
Mayor Republican Michael Bloomberg and the Democratic challenger Fernando Ferrer. Those in the treatment group were asked to watch the debate; those in the control were asked to watch the Jim Lehrer news hour, airing at the same time. Those in the treatment group were 21 percentage points more likely to claim to have watched the debate (and were a significant 14 percentage points more likely to correctly identify the race and gender of the moderator).
However, interviewed days or (in some cases) minutes after receiving new political information, those in the treatment group were no more polarized in their views of Bloomberg (and Ferrer) than those in the control group. Using thermometer questions patterned after those in the NES, we find "Watch*Republican Party" coefficients of 1.2 and -2.9 for Bloomberg and Ferrer respectively. However, once again this evidence against information effects is merely suggestive as our standard errors only allow us to reject increases in polarization of 11 (12.5) points or more on the Bloomberg (Ferrer) thermometer.
In this section we have provided evidence that the act of voting for president increases polarization of the electorate. Based on turnout for senatorial elections, this next test provides a complement to the results of this section.
Presidential Election Year Turnout Results
A second variable that has an impact on voting that is exogenous to intensity of beliefs is whether or not there is a concurrent presidential election. Senatorial elections occur both in presidential and interim election years. Americans are more likely to vote for
Congress when there is a concurrent presidential race.
In Table 8 
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The coefficient on "Same Party" suggests that members of a senator's party rate him 8.9 points higher than respondents who belong to another party. The coefficient on "Elected*Party" suggests that the polarization increases by 23 percent (2.04/8.9) for senators elected in a presidential year. This increase is smaller than in the prior test. That could be due to the fact that the voter turnout differential in this case is smaller than the large difference in voting between eligible and ineligible voters. 24 Scaling by the 15 percentage point turnout difference between the two groups, we find that the act of voting more than doubles polarization. The smaller increase in polarization may also be due to some feature of opinions about senators versus presidents. In either case, these results still represent a large, significant impact of voting on polarization of political views.
23 While once again we display only one specification, our results are robust to controlling for state*year and year*senator fixed effects as well as clustering by senate race* voter party. 24 As we noted earlier, young eligible voters vote at a 46 percent rate in Presidential elections, so the eligible to ineligible comparison is a comparison of 46 percent to 0 percent. The turnout differentials for Presidential versus non-Presidential elections is only 15 percent (67-52 percent). Thus we would expect an effect that is only 1/3 as large, and we are getting an effect that is ¼ as large.
In columns 2 and 3 of Panel A, we estimate this regression separately for senators elected two and four years prior. Since a senator's term lasts for six years, both groups of senators will still be in office, but not standing for reelection. This split allows us to examine the duration of voting effects on polarization. Results suggest that the duration is at least four years. In both specifications a senator's own party members rate him 9 percentage points higher than respondents of other parties. Further those senators elected during a presidential election, when turnout is higher, see an increased polarization in constituency views of 19 to 22 percent. However, the increase in polarization is only significant for the four year case.
In the final column of Panel A we address the potential endogeneity of party by employing an unconditional specification akin to that of Table 6 column 4. Here we run a logit of whether the respondent's feelings about the senator are within a standard deviation of the mean feeling towards that senator on whether the senator was elected in a presidential year. We find that voting eligibles are significantly less likely to hold opinions in the center of the distribution. Thus the results of column 4 are consistent with those in the previous columns, which provide evidence that voting increases polarization.
Confounds
One potential confound to the interpretation of this test as evidence of cognitive dissonance is that senatorial elections may differ in presidential and non-presidential years.
Perhaps there is more media spotlight on these elections, which increases polarization for reasons unrelated to voter turnout. 25 Or perhaps the type of candidate who runs differs in the two time periods. If, for example, stronger candidates stand during presidential elections when there is more turnout and stronger candidates are more polarizing, then candidate characteristics, rather than dissonance, may be driving our results.
26
To test the media spotlight hypothesis, we examine a twist on the basic senatorial specification. If the effect estimated in column 1 of Panel A of Table 8 is due to differential voter turnout, then it ought to be concentrated in the population that tends to turn out in presidential election years but not in non-presidential election years. To investigate whether this is in fact the case, we create for each respondent a predicted difference in probability of turnout in presidential over non-presidential years. The prediction is created in the following manner. First, we create two regressions of turnout on demographics: one for presidential and the other for non-presidential years. Second, we use the coefficients from these regressions to predict for each individual, the probability of voting in both presidential and non-presidential election years. Finally, we subtract the second estimate from the first to obtain the predicted difference in turnout in presidential and interim election years.
In Panel B of Table 8 we re-estimate the specification in column 1 Panel A for two different groups. Column 1 is the half of the sample that has a below median difference in turnout, whereas column 2 has an above median difference in turnout. Again if Panel A column 1 results are driven by turnout (and not by increased media or some other aspect of presidential elections) than we should see that the polarization effect is concentrated in the second group, the group whose turnout behavior is more greatly impacted by the concurrence of the presidential and senatorial elections.
Results in Panel B indicate that both the below and above median difference groups show increased polarization of views of senators elected during presidential years compared with views of those elected during interim elections. However, the increase in polarization is only significant for the high difference group. Further, the magnitude of effect is much larger for the high difference group:
12 percent versus 49 percent increased polarization. However, the difference in increased polarization between the groups is not significant. Thus these results merely suggest that turnout, rather than some characteristic of presidential elections relative to non-presidential elections, increases polarization of political views.
Secondly, we examine whether differences in senatorial candidates may be driving our findings. In Table 9 we compare the characteristics of candidates who run in presidential years with candidates who run in non-presidential years. Candidates are remarkably similar across the two types of elections. Only one of ten differences in characteristics (whether at least one candidate has statewide experience) is even marginally significant. Incumbent, black and female candidates are just as likely to be running in presidential as in non-presidential years. The same is true of candidates with advanced degrees and those with military, House and local experience. There is no significant difference in frequency of contested elections nor in the liberal/conservative leaning of their voting record (as measured by the Americans for Democratic Action score 27 ) of winners in their first two years in office. These results demonstrate that candidate characteristics are not driving our Table 8 findings.
Implications for Voting Behavior
Though each has its limitations, the results of the two estimation strategies together provide evidence that the act of voting strengthens future opinions of the chosen candidate.
Those who are induced to turn out either by age eligibility or by a concurrent presidential election, show increased polarization in their views toward the candidates two or even four (in the case of senators) years post-election. Thus we provide direct field evidence of the importance of cognitive dissonance. This finding has implications for the political capital of politicians. By definition in a two party race more than half of voters vote for the winner.
But the question remains whether incumbents receive a similar boost come the following election when not only has more time passed, but additional information on the incumbent is readily available. In Table 10 we explore the effects of voting on age eligibles four years after the election, during the subsequent presidential election. The first column indicates that four years after the election, eligibles are no more polarized than ineligibles.
Column 2 limits consideration to those presidents who are eligible to run again. Eligibles are 23 percent more polarized about these incumbent presidential candidates, but the effect is still not significant. In column 3, we ask whether this increased polarization translates into increased votes. 28 And the answer is that eligibles of the same party as the president are an additional two percentage points more likely to vote for him than ineligibles of the same 27 For comparability across time we use the adjusted ADA scores calculated by Groseclose et. al (1999) . 28 We also examined the impact of prior voting eligibility on present day turnout. But we do not report these party.
These findings suggest that polarization is smaller but still existent at the time of reelection and that this polarization translates into voting behavior. However, our results are too imprecise to allow us to draw any conclusions. Therefore, examining the role of dissonance on voting behavior is an important topic for future work. 29 A finding that dissonance plays a role in voting behavior would have implications for understanding the dynamics of voter turnout. In particular such a finding would provide both a new rationale for the incumbency advantage and an efficiency argument for term limits. Finally, dissonance effects on voting would suggest that election efficiency is not necessarily increasing in turnout as high turnout today implies a large body of the electorate will be biased in their evaluations of the incumbent in future contests.
results as they are not stable across specifications. 29 Suggestive evidence that dissonance plays a role in the incumbency advantage comes from the fact that during the period 1984 to 2000, incumbent senators running in non-presidential years (after having last been elected in a high turnout presidential year) won by larger margins than those running in presidential years. The groups received 66 and 63 percent of the vote respectively, a difference that is statistically significant. 
The dependent variable is the respondent's feelings (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) toward the president. "Eligible to Vote" is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was able (by age) to vote in the previous election two years ago and "Same Party as President" is a dummy matching self-reported political party affiliation to the president's party. Robust standard errors. NOTES: Dummy dependent variables have been redefined so that dummy=1 is in support of the president. This adjustment applies to angry and afraid questions. Sample size varies because not all questions are asked in all years and not all questions are answered by all respondents. Specification includes year and state fixed effects as well as all demographic controls used in the basic specification. "Eligible to Vote" is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was able (by age) to vote in the previous election two years ago and "Same Party as President" is a dummy matching self-reported political party affiliation to the president's party. Robust standard errors. 1978-1998 1978-1998 1980-2000 1980-2000 ex. 1988 The dependent variable is the respondent's (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) feelings toward the president.
All regressions include year and state fixed effects as well as all demographic controls used in the basic specification. "Same Party as President" is a dummy matching self-reported political party affiliation to the president's party. "Eligible to Vote" is a dummy variable for the survey participant being in the older age group in the ages compared line. Robust standard errors. a) The "Eligible*Party" coefficients in column 4 is significantly differ from that of column 1. When columns 1 and 2 are combined into a single specification with dummies and interactions for the three age groups, the difference of the two interactions is significant at the 10 percent level. The dependent variable is the respondent's feelings (scale 1-100 with 100 being more positive) toward the president. "Eligible to Vote" is a dummy variable for whether the respondent was able (by age) to vote in the previous election two years ago and "Same Party as President" is a dummy matching self-reported political party affiliation to the president's party. Column 1 shows the basic specification (Table 3 ) without demographic controls. Column 2 replaces column 1 "same party" and its interaction with the president's party with a predicted vote variable and its interaction with the president's party. Column 3 is similar to column 1, but presents results in which party (in addition to the demographic characteristics used in column 2) has been used as a predictor of vote choice. Robust standard errors in column 1. Bootstrapped standard errors in columns 2 and 3. Columns 1-3 include state and year effects. Column 4 specification is a logit of whether the respondent rates the president within a standard deviation of the mean rating for the year on a dummy for voting eligibility in the prior presidential election (i.e., age 20-21). Robust standard errors. The dependent variable (except where indicated) is the respondent's feelings (scale 1-100 with 1000 more positive) toward the senator. All regressions (except panel A column 4) include year, state and age fixed effects as well as demographic controls. Panel A column 4 specification is a logit whether the respondent rates the senator within a standard deviation of the mean rating for that Senator in that year on a dummy for whether the senator was last elected in a presidential year. Robust standard errors clustered by state in all specifications. 
